SURVEILLANCE DETECTION REPORT
[VENUE / ROUTE - ENGAGEMENT REF]
The Surveillance Detection Report is the standard deliverable assessing potential hostile surveillance, designing detection routes, and recording sighting logs. Do not assert fictional findings or invent data.
Document Control
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Report Reference | [REF-YYYY-###] |
| Date of Report | [YYYY-MM-DD] |
| Reporting Period / As-Of Date | [YYYY-MM-DD] |
| Classification / Handling | [internal / CONFIDENTIAL] |
| Client | [CLIENT NAME] |
| Requesting Party | [REQUESTER NAME / ID] |
| Prepared By | [ANALYST NAME / ID] |
| Reviewed By | [REVIEWER NAME / ID] |
| Approving Officer | [APPROVER NAME / ID] |
| Version | [0.1.0] |
| Distribution | [NAMED RECIPIENTS] |
Handling & Legal Caveat
Handling: [internal / CONFIDENTIAL]. Access restricted to active operational team.
Sourcing: Grounded in physical SD observations and route recce.
Subject Snapshot
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Target Route | [ROUTE REF] |
| Target Venue | [VENUE] |
| Detection Date | [YYYY-MM-DD] |
| Hostile Surveillance Grade | [Low / Moderate / Elevated / High / Critical] |
Table of Contents
- BLUF
- Executive Summary
- Key Judgments
- Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)
- SD Mission and Legal Frame
- SD Route Design Methodology
- Static OP Selection Criteria
- TEDD Indicator Framework
- Sighting Log Format
- Correlation Analysis Method
- Confirmation Decision Tree
- Counter-Surveillance Response Options
- LE Handoff Package Checklist
- Annex A: Sources & Methodology
- Annex B: Grading Matrices
1. BLUF
2-3 sentences. Lead with the presence or absence of hostile surveillance indicators and the resulting threat rating.
[BLUF]
2. Executive Summary
Overview of the SD operation, routes monitored, and narrative of key sighting logs and patterns.
[EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]
3. Key Judgments
Key assessments regarding hostile surveillance activity. Separate likelihood (ICD 203 terms) and confidence.
| Judgment | Likelihood | Confidence | Change Indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| [e.g. Active stalker presence on route] | [almost no chance / remote / very unlikely / unlikely / roughly even chance / likely / very likely / almost certain] | [HIGH / MODERATE / LOW] | [e.g. Identification of new POI vehicle] |
4. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)
Matrix must contain exactly 4 columns: PIR, Answer, Confidence, Key Gap.
| PIR | Answer (summary) | Confidence | Key Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| PIR-1: Are there recurring vehicles matching the surveillance profile? | [ ] | [H/M/L] | [ ] |
| PIR-2: Have static OPs detected cameras focused on the principal entrance? | [ ] | [H/M/L] | [ ] |
| PIR-3: Is there a localized digital signal indicating cellular tracing? | [ ] | [H/M/L] | [ ] |
5. SD Mission and Legal Frame
Define the scope of surveillance detection, non-intrusion compliance, and local photography/monitoring boundaries.
- Scope: Passive observation only; no intercept or active tracking of third parties.
- Compliance: Public space recording limitations per [LOCAL REGULATION].
6. SD Route Design Methodology
Detail the SD route design, channel points, chokepoints, stakeout boxes, and timing legs.
- Channel Points: [LOCATION / STREET] forcing surveillance to follow inline.
- Stakeout Box: [LOCATION] allowing covert observation of trailing traffic.
- Timing Leg: [SEGMENT] requiring variable speeds to isolate tailing vehicles.
| Segment | Chokepoint | Stakeout Box | Leg Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| [Segment name] | [Chokepoint name] | [Box coordinates] | [Minutes] |
7. Static OP Selection Criteria
Define criteria for selecting covert static OPs.
- Line of Sight: Clear view of channel points.
- Cover: High pedestrian density or structural shielding.
- Egress: Multiple independent escape routes.
8. TEDD Indicator Framework
Define TEDD (Time, Environment, Distance, Demeanor) indicators with observable examples.
- Time: Same vehicle/person observed at different times of day (e.g. morning commute and evening return).
- Environment: Same subject in two distinct environments (e.g. hotel lobby and residential street).
- Distance: Subject maintains a fixed distance band across multiple route segment speed changes.
- Demeanor: Subject exhibits unnatural behavior (e.g. sudden U-turn when convoy turns, shielding face, taking photos of license plates).
9. Sighting Log Format
| Timestamp | Location | Subject Descriptor | Correlation Key |
|---|---|---|---|
| [YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM] | [COORDINATES] | [VEHICLE MAKE / COLOR / PLATE / SUBJECT PROFILE] | [CORR-ID-###] |
10. Correlation Analysis Method
Define what registers a correlation event. The verdict is not issued here; it is reached in Section 11 by counting correlation events.
- Correlation Event Rule: Register one correlation event when a correlation key matches the same vehicle or person across at least [N] separate sighting legs, the sightings separated by at least [N] minutes or [N] kilometers to rule out coincidental co-presence.
- A correlation event is a data point, not a verdict. Apply the Confirmation Decision Tree (Section 11) to the running count of correlation events to determine the threat verdict and the mandated action.
11. Confirmation Decision Tree
- Unconfirmed (0 correlation events): Maintain standard passive collection.
- Possible (1 correlation event): Vary convoy routing; notify Detail Leader.
- Probable (2 correlation events): Execute SD route bypass; notify Team Leader.
- Confirmed (3 or more correlation events): Execute LE handoff package and request municipal escort.
12. Counter-Surveillance Response Options
- Passive Evasion: Alter route segments via [BYPASS].
- Hardening: Move principal inside hardened perimeter and lock down posts.
- Law Enforcement Handoff: Coordinate arrest/interdiction via municipal channels.
13. LE Handoff Package Checklist
- Chronological sighting logs with timestamps.
- High-resolution images of subject and vehicle license plate.
- Correlation key summary documenting the confirmation rule breach.
- Primary operator contact information.
Annex A: Sources & Methodology
A.1 Methodology
This report methodology is derived from standard protective intelligence surveillance detection protocols. It consumes no active seams but feeds EP-014 (Covert Protection Detail) for tactical execution.
A.2 Source Register
| Source / Type | Admiralty Grade | Date Accessed | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| [Source Description] | [A-F/1-6] | [YYYY-MM-DD] | [Description] |
Annex B: Grading Matrices
NATO Admiralty source reliability (A-F): A Completely reliable · B Usually reliable · C Fairly reliable · D Not usually reliable · E Unreliable · F Reliability cannot be judged.
NATO Admiralty information credibility (1-6): 1 Confirmed by other sources · 2 Probably true · 3 Possibly true · 4 Doubtful · 5 Improbable · 6 Truth cannot be judged.
Risk scoring key: Likelihood (1-5) × Impact (1-5) = 1-25; 1-5 Low · 6-10 Moderate · 11-15 Elevated · 16-20 High · 21-25 Critical.
END OF REPORT
Model wiring
Generated from cell frontmatter at publish time.